Syria, The case for Intervantion

Since the alleged chemical weapons massacre perpetrated by the government of Syria upon its own people two forces have been in motion. The first, heads of government, namely Mr Obama, Cameron and Hollande who have now decided after two years of civil war the west has to finally intervene militarily due to the use of chemical weaponry. The second being the sceptical and seemingly much more popular group of critics, backed up by public opinion, who believe that any intervention in a conflict of the severe complexity of that which has been raging in Syria is unwise, potentially endless carrying the likelihood of any number of unforeseen repercussions and coming with no guarantee that the situation left on the ground, after western air forces have disappeared from the skies overhead, will be any better than it was beforehand. Looking at the relevant media coverage it is hard not to conclude that so far the anti-interventionists are winning the argument and presenting a much more convincing case on the side of scepticism and caution. Those in favour of military action seem to be putting across a rather incoherent case centred on humanitarian concerns over the use of chemical weapons against civilians yet apparently ignoring the Syrian government’s far more extensive and utterly devastating use of conventional weapons whose death toll makes the figures of the latest chemical attack pale into insignificance. The apparent message being, kill as many as you want but please use AKs instead of gas in order to cut out the hassle.

Clearly it’s not hard to dismiss such logic as simply absurd and its main support comes from graphic images of chemical weapon produced carnage to tug selectively on our heart strings. But does this mean that there is no sensible foreign policy objective that can be feasibly pursued through military action against the Syrian government? This certainly isn’t the case as long as broad based humanitarian concerns are pushed aside as well as regime change and crucially British national self-interests in upholding the non-proliferation treaty are placed at the centre of any argument made in favour of military action. This is the case that should and must be made in favour of intervention and it’s probably more importantly the case that must be answered by those who disagree with western military intervention. Needless to say the case to be made is not a perfect one as choosing from any and all of the potential policy options regarding the Syrian civil war strongly resembles an ugly baby competition of the highest calibre. Yet it is important to bear in mind that all decision in the realm of foreign policy come with risks as well as necessary pay offs, there is no such thing as a safe bet. 

As stated the premise of any attack must be in service and reinforcement of the chemical and biological non-proliferation treaty because any violation of the treaty by the Syrian government that goes unpunished only increases the incentives for other potentially unstable regimes in the region and around the world to acquire such weapons as proven insurance policies against any possible uprising. Assad must not be allowed to follow in the footsteps of Saddam by being able to use such weapons as a devastating last resort to stay in power, however viewed through the spectrum of British foreign policy, as coldly as it might sound, this is not in primarily in order to prevent loss of life as noted earlier if this were so then the prevention of the use and proliferation of conventional weaponry would also have to be of equal or even greater priority. From a stand point of self-interest the further proliferation of chemical weaponry as well as biological and nuclear only increases future vulnerabilities of them falling into the hands of terrorist groups or unstable state actors. Succinctly put allowing such weapons to fall on Damascus with no repercussions only increases the likelihood of them one day falling on London. Although much unfairly shunned this is what Mr Blair means when he says the prospective consequences of non-intervention are ‘unimaginably awful’.

Setting a strong president on showing the willingness of America, Britain and their NATO allies to uphold the non-proliferation treaty is made even more pressing by the previous statements made by president Obama about the existence of ‘red lines’ which could not be crossed without a military response. If the alleged chemical attack has happened then those red lines have indeed been crossed. Make no mistake the credibility of our resolve to meet our international responsibilities and to deliver on the threats that underlie them is in the balance. To hesitate and to retreat to new red lines, which would be as good as scrapping them altogether, is to give yet another victory to those who wish to do away with international law in everything but name, to do otherwise is to create a brave new reality in which would be offenders know that there is more than a strong possibility that repeating such crimes carry consequences. We do not need to be the world’s policeman; however we do need to police our own interests which rely more than ever on credibility of certain non-negotiable principles, one of which is the use of chemical weapons. To strike Assad is also to send a direct message to Tehran that, much like with Libya, the West is prepared to use military force when it’s most basic of demands are not met. And perhaps more importantly it would also show the Russians as well as the Chinese, to whom we are still their militarily superiors, that even when they exercise their counter-influence, we are prepared to defend our interests which as explained are bound up with our commitments to non-proliferation, entering into their own strategic calculation just how highly we prioritise these very basic requirements of nations.                 

The important accompanying point to this central argument is emphasizing that there is no necessary link between strikes to deter further chemical weapon usage and regime change. Notably, even though it hasn’t entered into many of the recent discussions about the crisis, we will not be the first outside power to conduct airstrikes into Syria with these same motives, as it should not be forgotten that Israel has already conducted several strikes so far, linked to fears of unconventional weaponry falling into the hands of Hezbollah. Airstrikes need not alter the balance of power in a war in which we have no clear ally or interest. All they need to do is to send a staunch message of warning to the Assad regime that its chemical weapons are out of reach and effectively useless unless it wishes to go the way of Gaddafi by fruitlessly opposing western military might. To do this it is not necessary to destroy all of Assad’s conventional military assets, only prove that we could if we wanted to and with ease. The message that needs to be conveyed to Russia and China is that we have no vital interest in regime change, which in the post-Iraq world is a political and increasingly financial impossibility anyhow. They can keep their ally intact for now as long as he abandons chemical warfare and there is no immediate reason why this should not be a palatable compromise.

Understandably there will still be those who believe non-intervention and splendid isolationism is a better bet than entering the unpredictable arena of armed conflict. However as already requested it is against the real politic logic outlined above and not emotive humanitarian knee jerk reactions or gloriously ignorant neo-conservative regime change plans that arguments in favour of non-intervention should test themselves. An answer is needed as to how non-proliferation can coexist with inaction? If this can be done then fair enough, but until then is it too much to ask for an end to the long line of smug commentators pretending to be radically counter consensus making Cassandra moans which equate all western intervention with the Iraq war? These Edmund Burke wannabes are as bad as the Noam Chomskyites who unconditionally reject any suggestion that western military force could ever be used in a productive fashion. To end by borrowing from Karl Marx it is the constant insistence of man to interpret the present through his experience of the past that clouds his judgement of reality, Syria is not Iraq and neither need it be so. Until we can get this into our heads then the ghosts of our past will continue to paralyse us upon every decision we make instead of informing or educating our judgement.      

How to change the world, Tales of Marx and Marxism. Or, a lot of waffle and tired nostalgia . . .

(A review of Eric Hobsbawm’s, How to change the world, Tales of Marx and Marxism)

Never before in field of historical literature has a title of a book been so misleading and unconnected to the body of words on top of which it stands. This is not to say that upon purchasing Eric Hobsbawm’s book, ‘How to change to world’, I was expecting a detailed blue print for doing just that, however I was expecting something a tad bit more dynamic than the regurgitation of the old and well-worn material about Marxism which the book sadly contains. Going by the title one could have reasonably have hoped for at least an engagement with or an analysis of some sort of Marxist thought possibly building on Hobsbawm’s unrivalled experience, at least in duration, of being one of its foremost English scholars. Instead we get a series of essays which provide a disjointed and rather bland chronological narrative of its development, which is acutely uninspiring to any reader already slightly familiar with the subject area at hand.  

The one essay perhaps of any note is the third of the sixteen, ‘Marx Engels and politics’. Here Hobsbawm, much like Terry Eagleton in his recent ‘Why Marx was right’, presents Marxism as something in reality which is distinct from the reputation that it has acquired both through its critics as well as its practitioners. Rather than being a manual from which the iron laws of history can be understood and then identified within the contemporary situation of the reader, thus providing a clear cut illumination of the direct and narrow road to socialism, Marxism is instead presented as a much more loose and non-specific elucidation of economic and historical tendencies. No longer inevitable, but instead increasingly likely, the end of capitalism and its replacement by another economic system, not specified in any detail by either Marx or Hobsbawm, though one that should be recognisable as being somewhat socialist is still forecast.

However this unoriginal apology begs as many questions as it answers. By reducing the explanatory powers of Marxism, by abandoning certain untenable frontiers, characteristic of Bolshevik and other popular hard line ultra-materialist interpretations, an explanatory vacuum is left gaping. What uses are there left for Marxism? Even though triumphantly Hobsbawm reassures us that it still has its uses, subject the modifications that need to be made, which again he doesn’t discuss in any detail, if at all, the critical reader is left wondering and awaiting answers.

An important problem being that most of what is left is not necessarily uniquely or originally Marxist. It is needless to say socialism precedes Marx and that Marx himself had very little to say on the subject. Viewing history as a progressive process towards human self emancipation also has traction elsewhere both pre and post Marx and the same goes for analysing human society through examination of its economic foundations. It is only in this last point concerning the realm of economics that Marx made any original contributions and the relevance of these contributions are not covered at all in Hobsbawm’s work, much like Eagleton’s. The all-important question of the relevance and validity of Marxist economics is that which underlies the ability of Marxism to make any of its pronouncements about capitalism its crises and contradictions and the future spectre of socialism which hangs over it. However by not even attempting to defend or even rejuvenate or modernise Marxist economics, which along with all classical economic theory, was overthrown by the revolution of ‘marginalist’ or subjectivist economics at the end of the 19^th century, Hobsbawm leaves the key stone of Marxism to sink into the abyss of theoretical obsolescent dragging much of the superstructure down with it. How he can do this and then say Marxism is still alive and well is surely the height of intellectual incredulity. Whether Hobsbawm avoids this subject knowingly or not it seems a fit tribute to a theory and an ideology which has always depended much more on its revolutionary and subversive aesthetic appeal than any thorough understanding of Das Kapital.